

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02368 241725 Z

41

ACTION MBFR-01

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-09

NSAE-00 RSC-01 EUR-10 L-02 PRS-01 TRSE-00 PM-03 IO-03

ACDA-10 GAC-01 SAJ-01 OMB-01 OIC-01 NEA-06 RSR-01

INRE-00 /076 W

----- 013912

P 241517 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8193

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T VIENNA 2368

LIMDIS NOFORN

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: NEXT STEPS IN VIENNA

1. SUMMARY. WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS TO COME TO AN OUTCOME ON THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES. AS REGARDS AGENDA, IN VIEW OF THE ALLIED TENDENCY TO VIEW ANY DIVIATIONS FROM AGREED FORMULATIONS AS SOMEHOW AUTOMATICALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE ALLIES, WE ALSO CONSIDER IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO INFORMALLY PROBE THE EAST ON THIS SUBJECT RATHER THAN GO DIRECTLY INTO FULL SCALE FORMAL DISCUSSION WHEN PLENARIES BECOME POSSIBLE. IF AN INFORMAL EXPLORATION OF EASTERN ATTITUDES ON AGENDA ITEMS BRINGS A NEGATIVE REACTION, WE COULD USE THE SAME METHOD TO TRY TO FIND A NEUTRALLY WORDED SINGLE DESCRIPTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED FOR USE IN THE COMMUNIQUE. END SUMMARY.

2. JUDGING FROM SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE LAST WEEK OR SO, WE BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE THAT A FAIRLY FULLY DEVELOPED SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL ON HUNGARY WILL EMERGE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS OR SO. IN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE, ALLIED REPS WILL HAVE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02368 241725 Z

TO REMAIN WITHIN THE LIMITS OF NAC GUIDANCE, ALTHOUGH THEY CAN, NONETHELESS, AS THE AD HOC GROUP AGREED ON MARCH 23, DISCUSS UNILATERAL STATEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE CONTEXT OF THAT GUIDANCE. BASING OUR ESTIMATE ON RECENT SOVIET REMARKS, A SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL COULD BE A DETAILED PROCEDURES PAPER WHICH INCLUDES HUNGARY AMONG THE SPECIAL PARTICIPANTS, WHETHER BY IMPLICATION OR SPECIFICALLY, BUT ALSO CONTAIN POSSIBILITY OF UNCHALLENGED STATEMENTS BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES AND POSSIBLY ALSO BY HUNGARY, EITHER IN PAPER ITSELF OR IN FIRST PLENARY, WHICH MAKE CLEAR THAT THE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN AGREEMENTS IS LEFT OPEN FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FALL. WHILE GUIDING DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS TO SOME EXTENT IN TERMS OF DISCUSSING UNILATERAL STATEMENTS, ALLIED REPS WOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN PRESENT ALLIED POSITION AND WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED SOVIET PROPOSAL. SUCH AN EXERCISE IS OBVIOUSLY A DELICATE ONE AND WOULD HAVE TO BE PLAYED BY EAR, STEP BY STEP, WITH AN EYE TO THE OVERALL PACKAGE RESULTING.

3. SUCH AN OUTCOME COULD BE REPORTED TO THE NAC BY AD HOC GROUP AS THE RESULT OF THEIR CURRENT EXPLORATIONS. UNDER FAVORABLE CONDITIONS, THE GROUP'S REPORT MIGHT INCLUDE A RECOMMENDATION SUGGESTING ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT PRESERVES THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON KEEPING THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE IN ABEYANCE. AS FAR AS WE ARE ABLE TO DETERMINE POSSIBLE REACTIONS OF THE AD HOC GROUP TO POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THIS KIND, ONLY THE BRITISH MIGHT RESIST WITH MUCH VIGOR. THE EXTENSIVE REPORTS OF THE PRESENT SERIES OF QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSION OF HUNGARY HAVE BROUGHT MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP STEP BY STEP TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT HUNGARY BE A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT IS A FIRM ONE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE CONCLUSION OF COUNCIL MEMBERS, WHO HAVE BEEN RECEIVING THE SAME REPORTS THROUGH THEIR NATIONAL DELEGATIONS IN VIENNA. BELGIAN MBFR REP TOLD US REP MARCH 23 THAT, WHEREAS HUNGARIAN ISSUE HAD HAD A SHOCK EFFECT ON THE BELGIANS WHEN IT FIRST AROSE AT THE OUTSIDE OF VIENNA TALKS, THERE HAD BEEN TIME IN THE INTERVAL PSYCHOLOGICALLY TO ABSORB IT AND TO REALIZE WHAT REAL ALLIED INTERESTS ARE IN REGARD TO HUNGARY AND THAT INCLUDING HUNGARY AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DAMAGE THEM. NETHERLANDS REP HAS IN RECENT AD HOC GROUP DISCUSSIONS OPENLY RAISED POSSIBILITY THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT TALKS WOULD BE TO HAVE HUNGARY AS A SPECIAL PARTICIPANT. NONE OF THE  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02368 241725 Z

MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP HAS TAKED EXCEPTION WITH THIS

CONCLUSION. FOR HIS PART, UK REP SEEMS TO REALIZE THAT EVENTS ARE MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION AND HAS DIMINISHED THE INTENSITY OF HIS INSISTENCE TO US THAT UK WOULD FIGHT AGAINST SUCH OUTCOME TO THE BITTER END.

4. IN CONVERSATION WITH THE UK AND FRG REPS MARCH 23 ON THE AGENDA ISSUE, US REP POINTED OUT THAT PART OF THE DIFFICULTY WHICH HAD ARISEN WITH REGARD TO THE HUNGARIAN PROBLEM RESULTED FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TENDENCY OF SOME ALLIES TO TRANSMUTE NEGOTIATION APPROACHES INTO CATEGORICALLY HELD ALLIED INTERESTS. THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE AVOIDED WITH REGARD TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA, OR EVERY POSSIBLE WORDING CHANGE IN AGENDA ITEMS COULD BRING REACTION THAT ALLIES HAVE SOMEHOW TAKEN A LOSS. IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS OUTCOME, IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE AN INFORMAL PROBE OF THE SOVIETS ON THE AGENDA PRIOR TO DISCUSSING IT IN PLENARY SESSIONS IF THE LATTER BEGAN AS A RESULT OF RESOLUTION OF HUNGARIAN PROBLEM. UK AND FRG REPS AGREED.

5. IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING CONVERSATION, THE IDEA EMERGED THAT, IF ALLIED AGENDA IDEAS MET HEAVY RESISTANCE DURING INFORMAL EXPLORATIONS, IT MIGHT BE BETTER, RATHER THAN TO FIGHT OVER EVERY WORD IN A LENGTHY PROCESS WHICH COULD HAVE DIVISIVE EFFECTS ON THE ALLIANCE JUST AT A TIME WHEN SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES ARE BEING DISCUSSED AT NAC, TO MOVE ON IN THE SAME INFORMAL FRAMEWORK TO THE EFFORT TO FIND A SINGLE NEUTRAL DESCRIPTION FOR THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH A DESCRIPTION COULD IN TURN AVOID A SIMILAR WRANGLE WITH ACCOMPANYING POSSIBLE PRESTIGE LOSS WITH REGARD TO THE TERM "BALANCED." WE BELIEVE THIS LINE OF THOUGHT IS REASONABLE AND COULD SAVE TIME, AND WILL PURSUE IT FURTHER WITH UK AND FRG REPS. HUMES

SECRET

\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* LIMDIS

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 MAR 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973VIENNA02368  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730338/aaaaihwk.tel  
**Line Count:** 151  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION MBFR  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <28-Aug-2001 by cunninfx>; APPROVED <26-Oct-2001 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> jms 971230  
**Subject:** MBFR: NEXT STEPS IN VIENNA  
**TAGS:** PARM  
**To:** MBFR  
SECSTATE WASHDC  
WASHDC  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005